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I. INTRODUCTION 
The present generation of political scientists has 
inherited a wealth of knowledge about the logical structure of 
majority rule processes. Thirty years ago Duncan Black (1948) 
began to publish a series of discoveries and rediscoveries about 
the properties of committee decisionmaking under majority rule. 
At almost the same time Kenneth Arrow (1951) proved a general 
result about the failings of collective choice mechanisms which 
included majority rule as a special case. Anthony Downs (1957) 
insightfully applied these early findings to a political setting 
-- that of free, two-party electoral competition, 
In the 1960s Plott (1967) identified a set of necessary 
and sufficient (albeit restrictive) conditions under which 
majority rule processes produce stable outcomes. Sloss (1973) 
later generalized this work. Meanwhile, in a series of articles 
Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook (see 1970 for a review) generalized 
the Downsian model of electoral competition. Hoyer and Mayer 
(1974), and McKelvey (1975) summarized and synthesized much of 
this scattered literature. 
The 1970s have seen developments on two fronts. On the 
substantive front majority rule models have been applied to 
2 
legislative settings (see Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) for a review), 
More recently a succession of abstract articles has explored the 
nature of the indeterminacy characteristic of majority rule 
processes (McKelvey, 1976; Schofield, 1976; Cohen, 1977; Cohen and 
Matthews, 1977). For two reasons, however, this latest line of 
research brings us to an impasse. First, it dashes earlier hopes of 
finding reasonably broad contexts in which majority rule equilibria 
would exist. We now know that majority rule is generically unstable: 
the set of preference configurations which would support equilibria 
is vanishingly small. Second, earlier conjectures that the area 
of majority rule indeterminacy would be small and centrally located 
(Tullock, 1967) also prove unfounded. The area of indeterminacy 
usually turns out to be the entire policy space: majority rule can 
result in literally any outcome, depending on what proposals are 
matched and in what order. 
This onward march of knowledge has created an embarrassing 
situation for those who wish to apply abstract majority rule models 
to real political contexts. Take the study of electoral competition. 
If a majority rule equilibrium exists (an exceedingly unlikely 
possibility, the theorists tell us), both candidates are expected 
to adopt it and the election can be expected to end in a tie. In 
the general case of no equilibrium, the candidate who moves last can 
always win. Several authors have suggested that incumbents, by 
virtue of their past records, are fixed points in the policy space 
(Shepsle, 1972; Kramer, 1975). Thus, the challenger can always 
defeat the incumbent. In short, the application of abstract majority 
rule models to the study of electoral competition generates the 
conclusion that incumbents always lose, except for an occasional 
tie. This certainly qualifies as a nonobvious conclusion. 
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Rather than abandon the model at this point, some scholars 
have tried to make the best of the nonobvious conclusion. Downs, 
for example, developed his classic concept of "the coalition of 
minorities" after considering the hapless position of the incumbent 
party. Kramer (1975) embraces the nonobvious conclusion by 
constructing a dynamic model in which the stationary incumbent loses 
every election to the mobile challenger. The ensuing perpetual 
alternation of the two parties produces a probabilistic convergence 
to a "centrally located" (the minimax set) portion of the policy 
space. 
Other researchers are less comfortable with the notion 
that incumbents always lose. To be sure, of the last three 
American presidents, one lost, one withdrew, and one evidently 
feared defeat sufficiently to engage in some extraordinary campaign 
practices, American state governors, moreover, have long been 
known to experience rough electoral sledding ( Turett, 1971) . 
But when we turn to American congressmen, British MPs, legislators 
of all stripes -- the abstract theoretical prediction fails. Indeed, 
a major current area of inquiry in the legislative subfield is to 
explain the apparently overwhelming advantage of incumbency. 
Obviously, a variety of ad hoc explanations are available. Most of 
these focus on the invisibility of the challenger and the massive 
advertising campaigns of incumbents, But such explanations seem to 
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conflict with the basic spirit of rational choice majority rule 
models, in that citizens are implicitly assumed to respond to 
advertising regardless of content. Granted, citizens may form 
their preferences on any basis they choose, but from an epistemo­
logical standpoint, to allow any and all preferences no matter how 
frivolous, is to trivialize the majority rule model. We doubt 
that many of its adherents would accept this way out. 
Our contention in this paper is that existing majority 
rule models are not empirically wrong, just incomplete, and not 
incomplete in the sense that they ignore personal psychology, but 
incomplete in the sense that they ignore certain obvious and easily 
representable asymmetries between the candidates, Implicitly, 
existing models presume that candidates compete for executive 
office. The citizen assumes that if one candidate (or Downsian 
"team") wins, one platform is implemented, whereas if the opponent 
wins, another platform becomes public policy. But the situation 
is different when the citizen chooses between candidates for 
legislative office. Public policy is determined by the winning 
candidate from one district acting in concert with the winning 
candidates from all other districts. Other things equal, this 
fact diminishes the incentive for a citizen to vote on the basis 
of the candidate's policy platforms and increases uncertainty 
about the policy consequences of the election. At the least, 
the citizen must decide how to deal with that uncertainty, and 
some ways of dealing with it may involve increased attention to 
other factors, factors not limited to mere name recognition or a 
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pretty face. 
This paper outlines a model of voting in contemporary 
legislative elections. The model presumes that such elections take 
place in single member districts. Thus, it is principally applicable 
to the anglo-American democracies. Like the traditional models, 
this one too presumes a fully-informed citizen, but information is 
assumed to extend beyond knowledge of a policy space and the 
candidates' positions within it. By "fully informed" we mean a 
citizen who understands the various ways in which legislative 
activities affect him, the essentials of legislative procedures and 
processes, and in particular the sources of influence within those 
1 procedures and processes. 
Our contention is that modern legislators do more than 
participate in the formulation of major national policies. Too 
of ten it is assumed that electoral competition is limited to public 
goods space; this is an assumption which represents the most naive 
variant of classical democratic theory. Legislators from single­
member districts always have indulged and continue to indulge in 
a second activity: they provide quasi-private goods to their 
districts. The term "pork barrel" conjures up visiohs of legis­
lators scrambling to procure dams, locks, irrigation projects, and 
public buildings and facilities of all kinds. Moreover, the 
concept now extends to defense contracts, urban renewal and mass 
transit grants, neighborhood health centers, worker training and 
retraining centers -- the list is lengthy. 
In recent years yet a third activity has come to absorb 
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an increasing amount of legislators' time and resources: casework. 
The large, complex bureaucracies of modern postindustrial societies 
increasingly impinge on the daily lives of their citizens. Regu­
lations constrain what one can or can not do, and opportunities to 
profit from government programs are available to an ever larger 
portion of the citizenry. Although it is casually remarked that 
bureaucracies have a momentum of their own, it is true that legis­
lators can have an impact on bureaucratic decisions, the more so 
the more discretionary those decisions. This is particularly true in 
the United States where legislatures play an important role in the 
budgetary process and show considerable independence in the 
authorization process as well. But legislative concern with 
bureaucratic decisionmaking is evident even in such purportedly 
"rubber stamp" legislatures as the British Parliament. 2 
The model we propose simply recognizes that legislators 
engage in each of the preceding three activities and that their 
constituents recognize that they do so. Furthermore, the model 
incorporates an asymmetry between incumbents and their challengers, 
an asymmetry which we regard as empirically true and deserving of 
explicit theoretical recognition. 
II. THE ANALYSIS: THREE CONCERNS OF THE INFORMED LEGISLATIVE 
ELECTORATE 
We assume that citizens' evaluations of the three varieties 
of legislative activity are analytically separable, i. e. that we 
can examine each in isolation then combine them under the assumption 
that no interactions override the separate analyses. 
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A. The Policy Component -0f Congressional Voting 
In this section we utilize the following notation: 
I the incumbent's platform 
c the challenger's platform 
The standard electoral competition model presumes that the citizen's 
preferences for candidates can be represented by a utility function 
whose arguments are the policies advocated by the candidates and 
those preferred by the citizen, i. e. candidate I is preferred to 
3 candidate C only if U{I) > U{C). 
Perhaps the preceding formulation is a useful approximation 
of a citizen's evaluation of candidates for executive office. In 
that case the citizen presumably gets one platform or the other, 
although real governors, premiers and presidents find themselves 
stymied to some extent by legislatures, bureaucracies and courts. 
But what about the evaluation of candidates for legislative offices? 
The winning candidate joins other winning candidates (434 other 
winning candidates in the case of the U. S. House of Representatives) 
who collectively determine an outcome. 
In a legislative election it seems more accurate to model 
the citizen as choosing between lotteries. With some probability, 
p (I), the incumbent will successfully implement his platform, and 
with complementary probability will not, and similarly for the 
challenger. The expected utilities of the legislative candidates 
based on policy stands are given by: 
EU (I ) p 
EU (C ) p 
p{Ip)U{Ip) + (1-p (Ip))U (l\Ip)} 
p (C )U (C ) + (1-p (C ))U{l\C ) p p p p 
Just what are the outcomes when the candidates fail to implement 
their platforms? Letting script L signify "Legislature, " the 
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preceding equations posit that the citizen forms estimates of the 
outcomes the legislature produces (would produce) if the incumbent 
and challenger respectively were unsuccessful in implementing their 
platform. 4 These (l\I) and (l\ C) outcomes are basically those 
which obtain when the citizen's representative makes no difference 
to the policy output of the legislature. In the remainder of this 
analysis we will assume that the citizen estimates that {l\I) and 
(l\C) = ND, the "no difference" outcome. 
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At this point we abandon the symmetry which characterizes 
existing models by making the following assumption of incumbent 
effectiveness: 6 
(1) 
p (I ) > p (C ) p p (2) 
There are numerous empirical grounds on which to motivate this 
asymmetric assumption. Most obviously, the incumbent has a store 
of experience -- firsthand knowledge of how legislative processes 
work. Second, incumbents may hold formal positions of authority. 
Currently in the U. S. House, for example, there are about 150 
committee and subcommittee chairmanships as well as a variety of 
party posts. In any given election probably 40 percent or more of 
American voters are evaluating an incumbent who holds a leadership 
post. Third, the odds are that incumbents are members of the majority 
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party (roughly 2:1 in the U. S. House at present), and thus more able 
to influence the committee and party leadership. Of course, the 
assumption of incumbent effectiveness can go awry in some cases --
particularly for minority party members -- but in general we think 
it captures an important feature of legislative elections. 
In choosing between incumbent and challenger the citizen 
determines whether EU (! ) > EU (C ) or vice-versa, making no choice p p 
if they are equal. Thus the incumbent is preferred on� 
grounds if 
or if 
p (l ) U (C ) - U (ND) p p --- > -------
p ( C ) U (I ) - U (ND) p p 
p (I ) U (C ) - U (ND) p p 
when U (I ) > U (ND) p 
-- < -------
p (C ) 
p U (I ) - U (ND)p 
when U (I ) < U (ND) p 
From the incumbency effectiveness assumption we know that p (I )/p (C ) p p 
is greater than one. This fact permits a determination of the 
candidate preferences produced by all but two of the possible 
preference orderings over the alternatives {I, C, ND}. These 
implications are contained in the following table where notation is 
simplified by suppressing the superscript, p. 
[Table 1 here] 
(3a) 
(3b) 
Incumbent 
Incumbent 
Incumbent 
TABLE 1 
CANDIDATE PREFERENCES BASED ON POLICY COMPONENT 
OF CONGRESSIONAL VOTING 
Ranked First: 
U (I) > U (ND) > U (C) 
U (I) > U (ND) U (C)
prefer I 
U (I) > U (C) > U (ND) 
-
U (I) > U (C) U (ND) 
Ranked Last: 
U (C) > U (ND) > U (I) 
U (C) > U (ND) U (I) 
prefer C 
U (ND) > 
-
U (C) > U (I) 
U (ND) > U (C) U (I) 
Middle Ranked: 
U (C) > U (l) > U (ND) - depends, IE favors I 
U (ND) > U (I) > U (C) - depends, IE favors c 
Indifference: 
U (I) U (C) U (ND) - indifference between I and C 
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The striking thing about Table 1 is the perfect symmetry which exists 
even under the asymmetric assumption of incumbent effectiveness. 
For every preference ordering which produces a preference for the 
incumbent, there is a "mirror image" which produces a preference 
for the challenger. Even the two indeterminate cases contain a 
curious symmetry: the comparative statics are precisely opposite, 
That is, if U (C ) > U (I ) > U (ND), increased incumbent effectiveness p p 
is more likely to produce an incumbent preference (the citizen may 
vote for a more effective second choice). But if U (ND) > U (I ) > U (C ) ,  p p 
increased incumbent effectiveness is less likely to produce an 
incumbent preference. 
The underlying basis for all this symmetry is clear upon 
a moment's reflection. Incumbent effectiveness is a two-edged sword. 
Those who favor the incumbent's platform (relative to the C and ND 
alternatives) naturally value incumbent effectiveness. But those 
who dislike the incumbent's position to the extent that they would 
prefer the position the rest of the legislature would adopt do not 
attach positive value to incumbent effectiveness. Quite the contrary. 
They would sooner countenance an incompetent challenter than an 
effective incumbent whose policies they loathe. In short, incumbency 
effectiveness does not translate directly into incumbency advantage. 
There a variety of perspectives from which to view Table 
1. One of the more interesting is from the point of view of a world
in which policy preferences are randomly distributed. If we were to 
take 100,000 citizens (a low estimate of average turnout in an off-
year American election) and assign them values of U (I ) ,  U (C ), and p p 
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U (ND) on a random basis, then have them vote in accord with 3a and 
3b, the expected outcome of the election would be a tie. Thus, the 
incumbency advantage is not the simple product of incumbent 
effectiveness. 
Random worlds aside, a second possible perspective is 
that taken by existing models of electoral competition. What 
happens when a majority rule equilibrium exists? When one does not? 
To address these questions it is necessary to make a rather strong 
assumption: all citizens in a district form the same estimates of 
'legislative output when their representative makes no difference, 
i. e. all citizens agree upon the policies signified by ND (they 
may of course differ about the desirability of ND). 
If a majority rule equilibrium exists, electorally rational 
candidates choose it. Thus, only three preference patterns can be 
observed among the citizenry:7 
U (I ) p 
U (I ) p 
U (ND) 
U (C ) > U (ND) => prefer I p 
U (C ) p 
> U (I ) p 
U (ND) => indifference 
U (C ) => prefer C p 
From the definition of a majority rule equilibrium a minority of 
8 citizens has the third ordering. Moreover, assuming indifferents 
split their vote exactly 50-50, the definition precludes the third 
group from being larger than the first. Thus incumbency effective-
ness gives the incumbent an edge. 
In the much more likely case of no majority rule equili-
brium, the incumbent, who moves first in the electoral game (by 
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casting roll call votes, for example), can be outmaneuvered by the 
electorally rational challenger. Thus, a majority of citizens has 
one of the following preference orderings: 
U (C ) > U (ND) > U (Ip)} p which produce 
U (ND) > U (C ) > U (I ) challenger preferences p p 
U (C ) > U (I ) > U (ND) which is indeterminate p p 
In this case the incumbent can only win if the third category is 
sufficiently numerous and sufficiently unresponsive to differences 
in C and I to deny a majority to the challenger because of greater 
effectiveness of incumbents. And what is the incumbent's strategy? 
Those in the third category are susceptible to arguments for 
incumbency effectiveness -- campaigns based on experience, seniority 
and the like. But remember, there is a "mirror image" category 
(U (ND) > U (I) > U (C)) ,  some of whom are already in the incumbent's 
camp, who will be repelled by that very strategy. In sum, given the 
likely nonexistence of a majority rule equilibrium, the electoral 
prospects of the incumbent are not generally predictable; they depend 
on the precise configuration of voter preferences. 
All of the foregoing can be summarized in a fairly simple 
statement. In a full information model of competition for legislative 
office, where competition is restricted to the �domain, and 
incumbents are more effective than challengers in influencing policy, 
incumbency carries no general electoral advantage. 
B. The Pork Barrel Component of Legislative Voting 
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Once a program is in operation the concern of the legislator 
may change. The costs of national activities are spread across all 
districts but the benefits typically can be and are appropriated by 
specific areas and/or groups. Whether a particular legislator favors 
the virtually unlimited construction of water treatment plants, for 
example, once the legislature has made that decision a legislator 
should attempt to procure as many plants for his or her district as 
possible. After all, construction of the plants creates jobs and 
perhaps cleaner water, most of which will be paid for by taxes raised 
in other districts, In addition, the plants serve as visible 
reminders of the efforts of the legislator on behalf of the district. 
In the pork barrel sphere the informed voter has no 
difficulty in specifying the ND outcome: nothing. In the legislature 
it is every district for itself. If one's representative does not 
bring home the bacon, no one does. This fact severely restricts 
the domain of reasonable preferences for the informed voter: some 
is better than none. The incumbent and challenger may have a 
different emphasis (urban pork vs. rural pork, construction pork vs. 
services pork, etc,) but the pork package advocated by either should 
be preferred to the ND outcome which is simply no benefits with 
virtually the same taxes. 9 Thus, the citizenry will fall into the 
following two categories: 
> > U (ND) 
> > U(ND) 
If we let b (I
b
) and b (Cb
) denote the incumbent's and challenger's 
(4) 
15 
respective probabilities of bringing home the bacon they promise, 
the expected utility of the incumbent from pork barrel programs, 
EU (I ), exceeds that of the challenger, EU (Cb)'  if p 
> (5) 
Again we assume incumbent effectiveness: 
All citizens with the first preference ordering listing in 
(4) satisfy (5), i. e. prefer the incumbent. In addition some of those 
with the second ordering also satisfy (5) . Moreover, if the relative 
effectiveness of the incumbent increases, the proportion of voters 
with the second ordering who will vote for the incumbent will also 
increase. 
Considering a random world again, the conclusion for the 
pork barrel component of an election is different from that suggested 
for the policy component. With randomly assigned preferences (subject 
to the restrictions embodied in (4) ) ,  the incumbent would expect� 
minimum of half the votes, expecting a vote proportion in the interval 
[.5, 1.0) rather than exactly at . 5  as previously. This advantage 
results directly from the relatively greater homogeneity of preferences 
in the pork barrel sphere. All constituents would rather have some-
thing than nothing, so to speak. 
If a majority rule equilibrium exists in the pork barrel 
arena, 
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for all citizens 
and the incumbent is unanimously preferred. If there is no majority 
rule equilibrium, the incumbent can be outmaneuvered so that for a 
majority, 
( ) > U (I ) > U (ND) => indeterminate preference U Cb b 
while for the remainder, 
U (Ib) 
> U (Cb) > U (ND) => prefer I 
The incumbent can win if enough of those in the first category prefer 
a more effective second choice to a less effective first choice. 
Ceteris paribus, the greater is the relative effectiveness of 
1, s the likelihood that "enough" of those in incumbents, the greater 
the first category will prefer the incumbent to the challenger. 
The upshot of all this clear. If we were incumbents, we 
would rather campaign on pork than on policy, unless we had some 
prior assurance that policy preferences would be as homogeneous as 
pork references are expected to be. 
C. The Casework or Servic� Component of Legislative Voting 
The service component is essentially the same as the pork 
barrel component. The incumbent and challenger may differ in 
emphasis, but the package of ombudsman services offered by either 
is preferred to the ND outcome, which again is no services. In the 
U.S. , for example, if your Representative will not oblige you by 
tracking down a lost social security check or interceding with OSHA, 
no one else will. Thus, the informed citizen should have one of 
the following two preference orderings for packages of services: 
'.". U (C ) s 
> U (I ) s 
> U (ND) 
> U (ND) 
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If we let s (Is) and s (Cs) stand for the incumbent's and
challenger's respective probabilities of delivering their promised 
package of services, the expected utility of the incumbent from 
services, EU (Is) exceeds that of the challenger, EU (Cs) if
s (Is) 
--- > 
s (Cs) 
As in the pork barrel case the incumbent would have an 
expectation in the interval [.S, 1.0) if the service component alone 
were operating in a random world. If a majority rule equilibrium 
exists, the incumbent would win a unanimous victory. If no such 
position exists, the incumbent should stress effectiveness. Again, 
if we were incumbents who wished to stay incumbe�ts, we would rather 
run as ombudsmen than as the architects of national policy. 
D. Summary of the Voting Model 
In the preceding pages we have tried to develop a model 
which would allow incumbents an edge in legislative elections rather 
than place them at a disadvantage as interpretations of existing 
models seem to do. Our model differs from its forerunners in two 
respects. First, it recognizes the varied nature of legislative 
activity. The formulation of national policy is not the only task 
engaged in by contemporary legislators. Constituents expect other 
(6) 
(7) 
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things as well, and these other expectations are likely to be more 
homogeneous than those concerning policy formation. Second, our 
model recognizes that election of a legislator is not equivalent to 
selection of a policy program; election only sends legislators into 
another game with other elected candidates. Thus, in legislative 
elections citizens are choosing between platforms which will be 
realized only probabilistically. Moreover, in very large legislatures 
and with a strong executive, these probabilities may be quite small 
in most elections. As a result, voters must consider what happens in 
the event that neither contending candidate is effective, a third 
prospect not apparent in models of two candidate competition for 
executive office. Moreover, in choosing between two legislator-
lotteries citizens presumably are discerning enough to recognize 
that experience in holding office has certain consequences. Is it 
not reasonable to assume that a subcommittee chairman with six years 
experience will be more effective than a freshman Republican, for 
example? We have shown that the interaction between incumbent 
effectiveness and preference homogeneity generates an incumbency 
advantage. Interestingly, however, where preferences are heterogeneous, 
as they may be in the policy realm, incumbency effectiveness cuts 
both ways. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY
One mark of a useful theory is its ability to illuminate 
facts beyond those it was constructed to explain. In this section 
we propose a variety of empirical hypotheses which are implied by our 
model of legislative voting. These hypotheses fall into two 
categories: process implications and policy implications. 
A. Process Implications 
The model suggests that incumbents will place a heavy 
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emphasis on project, grant, and service activities in their electoral 
campaigns, because it is in these areas that incumbency generates 
an electoral advantage. Thus, we expect incumbent advertising to 
focus heavily on the aforementioned activities. Incumbents will 
emphasize their role as spokespersons for local interests, ever on 
the lookout to insure that the district gets its share of nationally 
10 funded largesse. It is no accident, for example, that even 
conservative U. S. Representatives herald their success in bringing 
federal monies to their districts. 11 Moreover, we should observe 
incumbents attempting to build an image of concern with the personal 
problems of constituents, and of general availability to them. 
Fenno (1978) has studied the efforts of congressional incumbents 
to build feelings of amorphous trust and accessibility among 
constituents. The preceding argument implies that incumbents are not 
just playing on affective feelings on the part of constituents. In 
addition, they may be rationally encouraging constituents to form high 
estimates of incumbent effectiveness in an area (personal servicing) 
where high estimates lead to electoral successes. Only when issue 
positions enjoy overwhelming majority support among constituents 
whould we observe incumbent emphasis on issues. It is easy and safe 
to be policy oriented if one is on the right side of an 80:20 split. 
A second set of process implications concerns comparisons 
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across legislatures. Although legislative incumbents in general are 
expected to shy away from an issue emphasis relative to a service 
and project emphasis, certain features of legislatures may reinforce 
that tendendy. For example, in the U.S. House we find a strong 
committee system, the components of which are relatively autonomous 
when overseeing the bureaucracy, but much less so when drawing up 
national policy. Thus, for the typical U.S. Representatives, 
b (I) > p (I) , s (I) > p (I), providing all the more reasons for a project 
and service emphasis. In contrast, legislatures with a weak or 
nonexistent committee system (such as the British Parliament) provide 
a more balanced incentive system to their members and in turn to 
their electorate. In proportional representation (PR) systems the 
model ceases to apply. In a PR system projects and services may 
provide benefits to a �. but not directly to a particular 
legislator. As with public goods generally, individuals will tend 
to shirk the cost of providing the general (i.e. party) benefit, 
Thus, legislative systems probably can be arrayed along a rough 
continuum according to the incentives they provide their members 
and voters to emphasize projects and services relative to policy 
formation. 
A third set of process implications follows from a 
consideration of estimates of incumbency effectiveness. Other things 
equal (usually overlooked in existing empirical studies) the size of 
the incumbency advantage should vary with certain objective charac-
teristics of incumbents. Most obviously, members of an apparently 
permanent majority party should have an even greater advantage. 
Voters will realize that the minority party candidate has little 
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chance to implement a policy proposal. And when voters turn to the 
project and service components, the majority party candidate 
especially if incumbent -- will typically have the advantage there 
because the party controls the committee structure. Once 
the legislative party balance appears to depart permanently from an 
even split, the incentives facing voters will lead to eventual 
eradication of the minority party unless some exogeneous shock to the 
system overrides the micro-motives we have identified. 
B. Three Public Policy Implications 
If the theory developed in section II accurately describes 
a portion of electoral reality, three public policy tendencies should 
exist. For shorthand we refer to these as the bureaucratic tendency, 
the distributive tendency, and the growth tendency. We stress the 
use of the term "tendency. " Public policy will be more bureaucratically 
organized, more distributive in nature, and more extensive in scope than 
it would be in the absence of a legislative incumbency advantage, but 
the theory does not enable us to say how much.more -- perhaps a little 
bit, perhaps a lot. Moreover, while these tendencies constitute 
inefficiencies or costs associated with an incumbency advantage, any 
ultimate assessment of net impact should take account of positive aspects 
of service and project activities as well. After all, the expertise and 
influence of a representative in speeding bureaucratic actions and 
lowering the cost of dealing with government are valuable to society 
generally. Nevertheless, an incumbency advantage arising from service 
and project activities does change the nature of democratic government 
in potentially troubling aspects. 
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The Bureaucratic Tendency 
Because of the electoral advantage arising from influence 
over the bureaucracy incumbents should hesitate to create programs 
which are beyond discretionary control. In practice this means 
that programs will require more in the way of bureaucratic inputs 
than might be ideal. The point is best illustrated by American 
examples. There is something to be said for razing the present 
jerry-built structure of income security programs and replacing it 
with a guaranteed annual income implemented entirely through the 
tax laws. The marginal cost of expanding IRS would be 
less than the savings accomplished by closing down numerous existing 
transfer programs. Similarly, we could abandon the existing 
structure of educational grants and replace it with a simple voucher 
system. The savings in bureaucratic inputs are evident. Again, we 
could eliminate entirely the congeries of federal grant-in-aid 
programs to states and localities and replace it with general 
revenue sharing. As before, the bureaucratic savings are manifest. 
In each of the preceding cases there are arguments on both sides, 
of course, but one argument that is seldom recognized is the 
congressional stake in maintaining the more bureaucratic way of 
doing things. Naturally, legislators dislike the uncertainty 
attendant upon any major program shift. But beyond that, if benefits 
are distributed automatically (through tax refunds, quarterly revenue­
sharing checks, vouchers, etc. ) constituents may come to expect them 
as their due and not regard them at least in part as the gift of 
benevolent legislators. And if costs are imposed automatically 
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(tax payments) , fewer citizens are likely to seek the aid of their 
representative in efforts to avoid those costs. 
The preceding argument focuses on the credit-claiming 
aspect of constituency service: more bureaucratically administered 
programs present representatives with greater opportunities to 
claim credit for helping constituents procure benefits or escape 
costs. The bureaucratic tendency also arises from another consid-
eration which we might call the "avoiding responsibility" principle. 
Lowi (1969) argues, for example, that Congress writes legislation 
especially regulatory legislation -- in so general a fashion that 
an agency must make numerous detailed decisions before implementing 
it, While he attributes this practice to a public philosophy which 
emphasizes flexibility over uniformity and bargaining over the rule 
of law, others take a more cynical view: 
A major reason for the power of the bureaucracy in policy 
formulation is the frequent lack of congressional incen­
tives to adhere to the Schechter rule and establish 
explicit standards for administrative action.  This is 
particularly true in the regulatory realm, an area 
involving political conflict that legislators of ten 
wish to avoid. Congress is always willing to deal 
rhetorically with problems requiring regulation and 
with the area of regulatory reform, but real decisions 
on the part of the legislature will undoubtedly raise 
the ire of powerful pressure groups on one side or 
the other that are affected by government regulation. 
(Woll, 1977, p. 173) 
Why should representatives take political chances by 
setting detailed regulations sure to antagonize various political 
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actors? Why not allow an agency to do the dangerous work then step 
in to redress the grievances which result from its activities? The 
agency takes the blame and representatives claim the credit. But 
in the end both benefit. Representatives successfully wage their 
campaigns for reelection, and while popularly villified, bureaucrats 
receive favorable budgetary reviews in the committee rooms of 
Congress. 
In sum, our theory of voting in legislative elections 
suggests the existence of a bureaucratic tendency -- greater than 
optimal use of personnel, resources and government authority in 
the administration of public policies.12 This tendency arises 
from the dual desire of incumbents to maintain day to day influence 
on the operation of federal programs and to avoid the larger responsi-
bility for the overall consequences of those programs. 
The Distributive Tendency 
This second tendency is related to the first. Again, let 
us consider American examples. There is widespread agreement among 
professional economists that tax schemes are superior to subsidies 
and mandatory standards as means of attacking some important pollution 
problems. Yet one of the most popular congressional programs provides 
localities with grants to construct water treatment plants to conform 
to congressionally mandated standards. 13 The Model Cities program, 
originally conceived as a demonstration project in a handful of care-
fully selected locations, was immediately extended to a pork barrel 
project for hundreds of communities, many of which were not even cities 
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(Ripley, 1972, ch. 5) . Why did Congress show so little enthusiasm for 
the planned rebate of Carter's proposed energy tax increases, and so 
much more enthusiasm for returning the same money through a large trust 
fund which might have provided a fixed rail system for Southern 
California, more roads for Wyoming, and perhaps even canals for 
Oklahoma?
14 The common thread in each of the preceding examples is the 
distributive tendency. 
Put most simply, Representatives favor the creation of 
policies that appear as a federal (i.e. congressional) "gift" to 
their districts. Building thousands of sewage treatment plants 
may be an uneconomic way of cleaning up our nation's water, but 
the political benefits are no doubt positive, while taxing those 
who spoil the water might entail a net political cost. Spreading 
Model Cities projects around the country was the cost of getting 
any program at all through Congress. Returning constituents' money 
through transportation projects may create the illusion that the 
district has gotten something that the rest of the country has paid 
for, but universal rebates create no such illusion. 
Lowi (1972) argues that political science operates 
according to the axiom that "politics determines policy" whereas 
he contends that "policy determines politics. " His observation is 
insightful but we should recognize too that politicians prefer some 
kinds of politics to others. In particular, passing out federal 
plums is more pleasant than reforming the nation's tax laws. Lowi 
is quite correct in asserting that redistributive policy creates a 
different kind of politics than does distributive policy. The 
former creates a more dangerous and difficult kind of politics, and 
for that reason politicians prefer the latter arena to the former. 
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Recall the old concept of the "life cycle" of an issue. 
Issues arise from the agitation of intense minorities, some eventually 
become the subject of a great national debate, and some of these 
eventually become public policy after a difficult fight. But then 
the policy supposedly becomes widely accepted -- "legitimated" is 
the term often applied -- and controversy wanes. One explanation is 
that opponents of the policy see its worth after it is implemented, 
An alternate account is that great issues typically arise in the 
redistributive or regulatory arenas. By the time they become law, 
however, they have become infused with distributive elements in 
order to buy critical congressional support. This transition from 
regulatory or redistributive policy to distributive then continues 
as the policy is administered. Controversy wanes precisely because 
the class of beneficiaries grows so large. David Stockman (1975) 
describes just such a process in his discussion of the "social pork 
barrel. " Republicans who originally went to the mat against various 
Great Society programs quietly voted for renewal when the programs 
came up for reauthorization. 
To return to the general point, the distributive tendency 
seems to be a natural concomitant of our theory. When the choice 
is available, legislatures should prefer to structure programs so 
that decisions are project-by-project, or grant-by-grant. Automatic 
distribution according to fixed formula is not nearly so attractive 
politically. Perhaps an overlooked reason for Lyndon Johnson's 
success in steering Great Society programs through Congress was 
his appreciation for and willingness to use distributive politics 
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15 to purchase congressional support. Correspondingly, failure to 
appreciate (or willingness to deal with) distributive policymaking 
may be one of Carter's principal problems vis-a-vis his party in 
Congress (Davis, 1978) .  
One final remark. The distributive tendency no doubt 
reinforces the bureaucratic tendency. Project-by-project decisions 
require more bureaucratic resources than autmatic distribution 
programs. Additionally, once a program is enact,ed, the game changes 
(Weingast, 1977) . As may have happened to Republicans vis-a-vis 
the Great Society, upon enactment of a program constituents no 
longer evaluate representatives solely on the basis of their atti-
tude toward the program. Diehard opponents of a program may only 
succeed in penalizing their districts, perhaps as a result of 
direct bureaucratic action, but more likely by foregoing what would 
be their due under the (increasingly distributive) program. In 
short, the incentives shift as the policy is implemented, Given 
that a program will be enacted, a representative faces better 
reelection prospects if the program is designed to be distributive 
in nature and bureaucratic in administration. 
C, The Growth Tendency 
This third tendency is in part a consequence of the 
preceding two, and in part a consequence of factors not explicitly 
included in the theory. Stated simply, our model suggests that a 
legislative incumbency advantage contributes to a larger government 
establishment, In explaining why, it is useful to recognize at 
least three dimensions of government growth. 
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First is the size of the bureaucracy for any given level 
of public activity, The bureaucratic and distributive tendencies 
contribute to growth along this dimenson, To the extent that 
legislatures choose policy instruments which entail a larger 
commitment of personnel and resources than is necessary, the size 
of the government establishment is larger. 
Second is the intrusiveness of government activity. 
Bureaucratic means of implementing programs impose a burden on 
citizens -- the burden of providing detailed information to the 
bureaucratic decisionmaker, and then waiting for a decision. For 
example, a guaranteed annual income seems rather less intrusive 
than proving eligibility for the numerous income supplement/security 
programs now in existence. General revenue sharing seems less 
burdensome to local government than applying for numerous cate-
gorical grants. A tax to curtail energy use, perhaps returned by 
reductions in other taxes, is simpler for all concerned than detailed 
regulations regarding "entitlements" to domestic oil, conversion of 
certain boilers to use coal, and mandatory gas curtailments for 
particular types of users. Again, the bureaucratic and distributive 
tendencies appear to contribute to a more intrusive kind of government 
than would otherwise be the case. Moreover, the tendency of legis-
latures to avoid responsibility may be particularly important here. 
When legislatures abdicate responsibility, bureaucracies try to 
protect themsleves by promulgating detailed regulations to handle all 
possible contingencies. The result is an increase in the extent to 
which government constrains private actions. 
Finally, a third aspect of size is an expansion in the 
scope of government activity. This occurs when the government 
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chooses to regulate an area not previously regulated, subsidize a 
sector not previously subsidized, tax something not previously taxed, 
etc. What does our model say about this third kind of government 
growth? As representatives increasingly attain reelection on the 
basis of their broker and ombudsman roles, programmatic electoral 
accountability as traditionally conceived weakens. That is, 
incumbents have less need to hew closely to the policy positions 
of their constituents if the latter do not vote on the basis of such 
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positions. As the policy ties loosen, what do representatives do 
with their increased flexibility? The model addresses only one 
aspect of that question -- we have given our theoretical representa-
tives no preferences other than reelection, and that only narrowly 
defined, In that limited context, a representative would favor 
enacting programs that increase the demands for the service of the 
incumbent in dealing with the bureaucracy, for such expansion of 
government increases the ability of the incumbent to give favors 
and hence to be reelected. It would be natural, however, to expand 
the model to have representatives take a broader view of their 
personal interests. They might use their policy freedom to maximize 
campaign contributions and other political credits from well-
organized groups. In principle, such efforts need not lead to 
government growth. But we suspect that the preponderance of demands 
on government takes the form of requests for additional government 
activity -- new regulations for the consumerists, environmentalists, 
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and good government types, new subsidies and/or tariffs for business 
interests, new licensing provisions for various professional groups, 
new grant programs for common interest groups of all types, and so 
forth. Thus, to the extent that representatives are free to depart 
from close agreement with their constituents, the existing pressures 
appear to suggest departures in the direction of expanding the sphere 
of government activity, 
D. Summary 
The implications of our theory of legislative voting are 
potentially of great importance, if highly speculative at the present 
time. In addition to a "rich get richer" relationship between 
legislative majorities and minorities, we expect a systematic bias 
against certain types of policy instruments which may well be more 
efficacious than those actually chosen. Consequently, societies may 
experience a shortfall in public policy accomplishments which could 
contribute to increasing cynicism about the potential of democratic 
government. The same biases work toward the adoption of public 
policies which impinge on individual behavior more than is necessary 
and could thus contribute to an incrasing resentment of government 
activity, per se. Finally, though democratic politicians may decry 
big government, their individual, uncoordinated actions in support 
of their electoral interests contribute to that which they decry. 
The paradox is that at least in the short-term these systemically 
troublesome features of legislative electoral arenas benefit the 
politlcians who participate in them, 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In contrast to traditional models of electoral competition, 
we find nothing mysterious about incumbent success in legislative 
elections. To the extent that representatives act as ombudsmen and 
pork barrelers rather than policymakers, their political experince 
and formal positions give voters a legitimate reason to support them 
over inexperienced challengers, even if the latter offer somewhat 
more attractive positions on issues, But we caution that the 
individual rationality of the voter combined with the individual 
rationality of the candidates need not produce a government which 
is the embodiment of collective rationality. We have suggested 
several ways in which myopic individual rationality can produce 
systematic biases against particular classes of public policy 
instruments. Moreover, we have observed that an incumbency 
advantage based on constituency service may weaken· electoral 
accountability as traditionally conceived. The implications of 
such observations are neither fully worked out nor verified as yet, 
but a preliminary consideration raises questions which deserve 
attention. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. We are well aware that survey data on congressional electorates 
(e. g. Stokes and Miller, 1962) provide no support for such an 
assumption. For reasons we will not go into here we think such 
data underestimate the "true" state of awareness of the 
congressional electorate. But no matter, theories like that 
which follows do not have value only if they describe all 
citizens. If one is interested in examining marginal changes 
(of which a shift of 5 percent in the value of incumbency is 
an example), a theory which accurately describes only a 
marginal number of citizens may be sufficient to explain 
important changes in political processes and public policy. 
2. Preliminary interviews with British MPs lead us to believe that 
the literature considerably understates the importance of 
constituency service activities in the UK. 
3. Typically additional mathematical structure is necessary. With­
out going into detail, we will presume the usual standards for 
well-behaved utility functions such as convexity. 
4. In the real world success is seldom an all or nothing proposition 
as is assumed here. An alternate interpretation of (1) would 
be that the citizen expects a weighted average of the positions 
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of the incumbent (challenger) and the rest of the legislature. 
5. This appears to be a harmless assumption. The only time it 
might be seriously in error would be if the legislature were 
divided evenly between the two parties. In this case which of 
the two candidates won in the district under consideration 
could determine the organization of the legislature, the 
identity of the prime minister, etc. 
6. The reader should not jump to conclusions. As will be seen, 
assuming incumbent effectiveness is not tantamount to assuming 
incumbency advantage. 
7. This assertion presumes that the citizen's utility function is 
"neutral. " That is, platforms alone have value, not the 
identity of who advocates them. 
8. If a majority had the third ordering, then ND would be majority 
preferred to I and C, contrary to the definition of a majority 
rule equilibrium. 
9. The reader no doubt can recall ·some well-publicized examples in 
which a pork barrel project became a major issue. We concede 
that exceptions to the general argument exist. But legislators 
generally avoid pork barrel activities which will arouse 
opposition within their districts. This means that different 
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legislators emphasize different aspects of the pork barrel, e.g. 
dams and other construction in one district, health centers in 
others, defense contracts in still others, etc. 
10. This suggestion is consistent with Davidson's (1969) findings 
that the modal purposive role orientation of U.S. Representatives 
is "tribune." 
11. When Representative Burt Talcott (Republican, California) found 
himself in a tough race in 1976 he pitched his campaign around 
the theme that his Monterey district ranked third among 435 
Congressional Districts in receipt of federal money. Talcott's 
1976 ADA score was ten. He lost the election but the strategy 
was clear. 
12. For a more extensive and more formal analysis of this point, 
see Fiorina and Noll (1978). 
13. These are the water treatment plant construction grants now 
authorized by the Clean Water Act of 1972 and administered by 
the Environmental Protection Agency. 
14. The question became moot before it was seriously taken up, of 
course, when Congress killed the proposed energy taxes which 
would have provided the revenue in question. 
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15. At the beginning of Johnson's administration exactly two-thirds 
of all federal grants were project grants (the remainder being 
formula grants) . During the three year period 1964-1966 over 
80 percent of new grant programs were of the project variety 
(Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1967)) ,
16. Elsewhere (Fiorina and Noll (1978]) we prove that: (1) the vote­
maximizing policy position for an incumbent is for a larger 
public sector than is the vote-maximizing stance for a challenger, 
and (2) an incumbent can deviate from the vote-maximizing policy 
position in any direction by some amount and still win, given 
vote-maximizing behavior by the challenger, as long as incumbents 
are expected to be better facilitators and ombudsmen than are 
challengers. The second point is the source of some uncertainty 
as to whether the model we have developed leads to a more 
extensive public sector than traditional issue-based democratic 
theory. 
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